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Summary 
If India were to participate in any international effort towards mitigating CO2 
emissions, the power sector which is one of the largest emitters of CO2 in the country 
would be required to play a major role. In this context the study estimates the marginal 
abatement costs, which correspond to the costs incurred by the power plants to reduce 
one unit of CO2 from the current level. The study uses an output distance function 
approach and its duality with the revenue function to derive these costs for a sample of 
thermal plants in India. Two sets of exercises have been undertaken. The average 
shadow prices of CO2 for the sample of thermal plants for the period 1991-92 to 1999-
2000 was estimated to be respectively Rs.3380.59 and Rs.2401.99 per ton for the two 
models. These shadow prices can be used for designing environmental policies and 
market-based instruments for controlling pollution in the power sector in India. 
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1. Introduction 
Issues concerning greenhouse gas (GHG) emission and global warming have received a 
great  deal  of  attention  in  the  recent  years.  As  per  the  Kyoto  Protocol  signed  in  1997,  the 
industrialised countries, which have historically been mostly responsible for increase in GHG 
concentration, agreed to reduce the flow of their GHG emission by 5.2 percent below the level 
prevailing in 1990. While the developing countries do not yet have any binding commitment, 
there is a realization that large developing countries such as China and India need to take some 
action in this regard since they are among the large contributors to incremental emissions. Any 
commitment  by  India  towards  reducing  emissions  would  mean  that  all  the  sectors  in  the 
economy would have to make efforts for reducing their respective GHG emissions so that the 
national emission targets are met.  
Power sector in India is one of the largest emitters of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the country 
accounting for about 35.53 percent of the total CO2 emissions in the year 2001-02 (see Table 1). 
The main reason for such a high share is its heavy reliance upon coal. About 81.7 percent of the 
total power generation by the utilities in the country in the year 2000-01 was from coal (GOI, 
2002). In addition, the coal burnt in the thermal power plants in the country is of inferior quality 
thereby resulting in an even higher level of emissions.
1 Thus, in near future if India were to 
participate in any international effort towards mitigating CO2 emissions, the power sector, which 
is one of the largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the country, would be required to play a major 
role. 
In this context the present study analyses the potential costs imposed on the coal fired 
thermal power plants, one of the main sources of CO2 emissions in India, by the implementation 
of environmental regulation. More specifically the study aims to estimate the marginal abatement 
costs, which corresponds to the costs incurred by the power plants to reduce one unit of carbon 
dioxide  from  the  current  level.  The  present  exercise,  therefore,  seeks  to  derive  the  ‘shadow 
prices’ of reducing carbon dioxide emissions generated by the thermal plants in India. It thus 
attempts to provide an answer to the question: how much does it cost the thermal plants in India 
to reduce CO2 emission in terms of foregone output or revenue? These estimates are expected to 
help in formulating environmental policies. The marginal abatement costs thus obtained would 
                                                 
1 Coal used in coal-fired power plants in India has a low calorific value (around 3,500 Kcal/kg) and a high ash 
content (as high as 45%).   3 
provide guidance on whether the current regulation on pollution satisfies the cost-effectiveness 
criterion which is based on the principle of marginal abatement costs be equal across individual 
power plants (Baumol and Oates, 1988). It is being recognized by the developed world that the 
marketable emission permit system is a more efficient way of regulating pollution. The unit price 
of a marketable emission permit would be equivalent to the derived marginal abatement costs 
(Baumol  and  Oates,  1988;  Titenberg,  1985).  Consequently,  these  estimates  of  marginal 
abatement cost could be used to predict the price level of emission permits to be introduced. 
 
Table 1: Carbon dioxide Emissions in India (mn t CO2) 
Year  Aggregate Emissions  
Power Sector 
Emissions  
Share of Power Sector in Total 
Emission (%) 
80-81  244.71  68.06  27.81 
85-86  342.22  105.09  30.71 
90-91  481.70  170.42  35.38 
95-96  632.08  237.98  37.65 
96-97  676.80  250.49  37.01 
97-98  704.05  269.81  38.32 
98-99  632.41  185.33  29.31 
99-00  682.78  219.98  32.22 
00-01  736.49  242.98  32.99 
01-02  698.76  248.24  35.53 
Source: Derived from Energy Balance Table using TEDDY (various years) and IPCC (1995).  
 
  Theoretical framework of the study is based on production theory and in particular on the 
distance  function  approach.  The  distance  function  (also  known  as  the  gauge  function, 
transformation function, or deflation function) identifies a boundary or a frontier technology, 
which contains all observation on one side of the frontier and minimises a suitable measure of 
the total distance of all observations from the frontier. Although the basic ingredients of the 
theoretical framework on which the distance function is based was known long ago owing to the 
works of Debreu (1951), Malmquist (1953), and Shephard (1953, 1970), its application became 
popular only in the recent years by the works of Rolf Färe, Shawna Grosskopf and others. The 
methodology based on distance function framework was first developed by Färe et al.(1993) and 
applied by Coggins and Swinton (1996) to the US coal burning utilities. Hetemäki (1996), Kwon   4 
and Yun (1999), Murty and Kumar (2002) etc. have also used the technique to derive the shadow 
prices of reducing the undesirable outputs. The main advantage of using the distance function 
approach over the conventional ones i.e., the production, cost, revenue and profit function is its 
computation requiring only quantity data. This feature is of particular importance in the field of 
environment economics since price data related to environmental compliance costs are often not 
available or are unreliable.  
  The  present  study  uses  the  output  distance  function  and  its  duality  with  the  revenue 
function to derive the marginal abatement costs or the shadow prices of reducing CO2 emissions 
for a sample of coal fired thermal power plants in India. The remainder of the paper is organized 
as follows: the next section provides a theoretical model for estimating the marginal abatement 
costs. It also describes the methodology for deriving marginal abatement costs using an output 
distance function approach. Section 3 highlights the procedure for the empirical estimation of the 
model while Section 4 provides information on the data used and also discusses the estimation 
procedure. The estimated results are presented in Section 5. The final Section 6 concludes by 
summarizing the main results of the study.  
 
2. Theoretical Model 
The  conventional  production  function  is  defined  as  the  maximum  output  that can  be 
produced from a given vector of inputs. The distance function generalizes this concept to a multi-
output case and describes how far an output vector is from the boundary of the representative 
output set. We can define the output distance function in terms of the output set P(x). Suppose 
that a producer employs the vector of inputs  N R x + ∈  to produce the vector of outputs  M R y + ∈ , 
where  M N R R + + ,  are non-negative N and M dimensional Euclidean spaces, respectively. The plant 
technology captures the relationship between the inputs and outputs and is described by the 
output set  ) (x P . The output set P(x) denotes all output vectors that are technically feasible for 
any given input vector x, i.e.,  
} : { ) ( ) ( y produce can x R y x P i
M
+ ∈ = K K  
The output set is assumed to satisfy certain axioms, the details of which can be seen in Färe 
(1988). The output distance function is defined on the output set P(x) as 
N
o R x x P y y x D ii + ∈ ∀ ∈ > = )} ( ) / ( : 0 { min ) , ( ) ( θ θ
θ
K K    5 
The above equation measures the largest radial expansion of the output vector y, for a given 
input vector x, that is consistent with y belonging to P(x). The value of the output distance 
function must be less than or equal to one for any feasible output. The axioms regarding the 
output set P(x) impose a set of properties
2 on the output distance function some of which are as 
follows:  
1.  , 0 ) , 0 ( ≥ ∞ + = y for y Do  i.e., there is no free lunch. To produce outputs one requires inputs.  
2.  , 0 ) 0 , ( N
o R in x all for x D + =  i.e., inaction is possible. No output is possible from positive 
inputs. 
3.  ), , ( ) , ' ( ' y x D y x D that implies x x o o ≤ ≥   i.e.,  more  the  inputs  the  less  efficient  would  the 
production be. 
4.  , 0 ) , ( ) , ( > = µ µ µ for y x D y x D o o  i.e., positive linear homogeneity. 
5.  ) , ( y x Do  is convex in y. 
  Of particular interest for our purpose is the disposability properties of the technology 
with respect to the output, especially the undesirable outputs. We assume that such outputs are 
weakly  disposable  i.e.,  a  reduction  in  the  undesirable  outputs  can  only  be  achieved  by 
simultaneously reducing some of the desirable outputs. We also assume that the desirable outputs 
are  strongly  disposable  i.e.,  it  is  possible  to  reduce  the  desirable  outputs  without  actually 
reducing  the  undesirable  outputs.  In  other  words  the  outputs  are  weakly  disposable  if 
) ( ], 1 , 0 [ ) ( x P y then and x P y ∈ ∈ ∈ θ θ ;  and  strongly  disposable  if  we  have 
) ( ) ( x P implies x P y ∈ ∈ ≤ ν ν .  
  Let r = (r1, r2, …… rM) denote the output price vector. Using the output set concept we 
can now define the revenue function in the lines of Shephard (1970), and Färe and Primont 
(1995) as 
)] ( : [ max ) , ( ) ( x P y ry r x R iii
y
∈ = K K  
The  revenue  function  describes  the  maximum  revenue  that  can  be  obtained  from  a  given 
technology at the output price r. The revenue function, like the distance function, completely 
describes the production technology. Shephard (1970) showed that the revenue function and the 
output distance function are dual to one another. So, 
                                                 
2 For detailed descriptions of these properties refer to Färe (1988).   6 
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Thus the revenue function can be derived from the output distance function by  maximising 
revenue over output quantities, and the output distance function can be derived by maximising 
the revenue function over output prices. This duality between the output distance function and 
the revenue function can be used to derive the shadow prices of the outputs. These are relative 
output  shadow  prices  and  in  order  to  obtain  absolute  shadow  prices  additional  information 
regarding the revenue is required (Färe et al 1993). In order to derive the shadow prices of 
outputs we assume that both the revenue and distance functions are differentiable. We follow the 
methodology used by Färe et al (1993) to derive the shadow price of the undesirable output. Let 
m′ output be the undesirable output. In order to derive the shadow price of the undesirable 
output it is assumed that the price of at least one of the desirable output (say, the m
th output) is 
known and is equal to its shadow price, 
o
m r . Then the absolute shadow price  m r ′of the m′ output 
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As can be seen from equation (vi), the shadow price of the  m′ output (the undesirable 
output) is given by the product of the market price of the m
th output (the desirable output) and the 
marginal rate of transformation. This, in turn, is equivalent to the value of the foregone desirable 
output associated with the reduction in one unit of the undesirable output. In the above equation 
the ratio of the output shadow prices reflects the relative opportunity cost of the output in terms 
of the revenue foregone. In other words, it is equivalent to the marginal rate of transformation 
between the outputs. Thus the shadow prices reflect the trade-off between the desirable and 
undesirable outputs at the actual mix of outputs. Derivation of the shadow prices of undesirable 
output as given by equation (vi) is based on the assumption that the production is occurring at the 
frontier of the output set. But if the production firms lie within the output set and not on the 
frontier (i.e., for such firms the value of the output distance function is less than one) then there 
might be some problem in estimating the shadow prices. To resolve the problem of estimating   7 
the shadow prices for such inefficient firms one can proportionately increase all the outputs so 
that they are on the frontier. Such proportionate scaling of the outputs will have no affect on the 
shadow prices as the output distance function is homogeneous of degree one in outputs and 
therefore its derivatives with respect to the outputs as shown in equation (vi) are homogeneous of 
degree  zero.  Thus,  regardless  of  the  location  of  the  observed  production  combinations,  the 
shadow prices can be derived through an estimated output distance function by using the actual 
data of the inputs and outputs - both desirable and undesirable (Kwon and Yun, 1999). 
 
3. The Empirical Model 
  The present study uses the deterministic parametric method
3 for estimating the output 
distance function. The  objective of such an exercise is to analyse the potential cost, if any, 
imposed on the coal fired thermal power plants in India by the implementation of environmental 
regulation. Thus, the objective is to estimate the shadow price of reducing CO2 emissions (the 
undesirable  output)  expressed  in  terms  of  the  value  of  electricity  generation  (the  desirable 
output) foregone for a sample of coal fired thermal power plants in India by using the output 
distance function and its duality with the revenue function.  
  In order to derive the shadow prices by estimating the deterministic parametric output 
distance function we have to initially define its functional form. We choose to parameterise the 
output distance function  ) , ( y x Do as a translog function, as has been followed in the literature 
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In  the  above  equation  (vii),  x  =  (x1,  x2,  ……  xN)  denotes  the  inputs,  and  y  =  (y1,  y2,  ……  yM) 
corresponds to both the desirable and undesirable outputs. In the model y = (y1, y2, …… yi) are the 
desirable outputs while y =  (yi+1……… yM) represent the undesirable outputs.  In our empirical 
                                                 
3 The advantage of using the deterministic parametric method for estimating the output distance function is that it is 
easy to use and allows computation of a large number of parameters even with a small number of observations.    8 
model fuel (F), capital (K) and labour (L) are the three inputs while the outputs consists of 
desirable output, electricity (Y) and undesirable output, CO2 emitted by the power plants. We 
introduce a time variable t in the model to reflect technical change. In order to reduce the number 
of parameters to be estimated the terms of the products of time variable and logarithms of other 
variables are excluded by assuming a neutral technical change.  
  The  parameters  of  the  equation  (vii)  are  computed  by  using  the  linear  programming 
technique as suggested by Aigner and Chu (1968). Theoretically the value of the output distance 
function  ) , ( y x Do  cannot exceed unity and it must be less than or equal to one (assuming there 
are no measurement errors). Formally, 
. ......, , 2 , 1 0 ) , ( ln ) ( K k y x D viii
k
o = ∀ ≤ K K   
where  ) ......, , 2 , 1 ( K k =  indexes individual observation. By adding a non-negative error term, 
one can write equation (viii) as  
0 ) , ( ln ) ( = +
k k
o y x D ix ε K K  
where  ) 0 ( , ≥ ε ε denotes the non-negative residual or the error term.
4 Next we choose the ‘fitting’ 
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) , ( ln y x Do so that the sum of errors is as small as possible (Hetemäki, 1996). The parameters of 
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where  ) ......, , 2 , 1 ( K k =  indexes individual observation.  ) , ( ln y x Do  has an explicit functional 
form as given by  equation  (vii). We assume that the first  i outputs are desirable while the 
remaining  ) ( i M − outputs are undesirable or bad outputs. The objective function minimises the 
sum of deviations of individual observations from the frontier of the technology. We know that 
the distance function takes a value less than equal to unity, therefore the natural logarithm of it 
i.e.,  ) , ( ln k k
o y x D will be less than or equal to zero and the expression  ] 1 ln ) , ( [ln − k k
o y x D , 
which denotes the deviation from the frontier for observation k will be less than or equal to zero. 
                                                 
4 It may be noted that in the literature the non-negative error term is interpreted as the reciprocal of Farrell output 
based technical efficiency index.   9 
Our objective is to maximise the expression in equation (x) subject to the following constraints 
K k y x D xi
k k
o ......, , 1 , 0 ) , ( ln ) ( = ≤ K K  
This constraint restricts the individual observations to be either on or below the frontier of the 
technology i.e., there are no outputs outside the frontier of the technology,  given the set of 
inputs. 
  Desirable outputs are assumed to be strongly disposable, which implies that the output 
distance function should be increasing in desirable outputs. The strong disposability condition 
can be represented by the following inequality: 
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The constraint above ensures that the shadow prices of the desirable outputs are non-negative. In 
addition it is assumed that both the outputs are weakly disposable. This weak disposability is 
always  satisfied  for  the  output  distance  function  specified  as  the  translog  form  when  linear 
homogeneity condition represented by equation (xiv) and the symmetry conditions represented 
by equation (xv) are being imposed. Therefore, one requires no additional constraints when the 
restrictions denoted by equations (xiv) and (xv) are imposed (Kwon and Yun, 1999). 
  The weak disposability of undesirable outputs implies that the desirable output decreases 
when  the  emission  of  the  pollutants  or  the  undesirable  outputs  is  reduced.  The  following 
assumption satisfies the criterion of weak disposability of the undesirable output: 
K k M i m
y
y x D xiii k
m
k k
o ......, , 1 ; ......, , 1 , 0
ln
) , ( ln ) ( = + = ≤
∂
∂ K K  
  In  addition  to  the  above  constraints  we  also  impose  the  homogeneity  and  symmetry 
constraints into the model which can be represented as  
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  Equations (x)-(xv) represent the model we shall use to derive the shadow prices of the 
undesirable output. The model is solved using the GAMS programming tool. 
 
 
   10 
4. Data and Estimation Procedure 
  The empirical analysis is based on primary data collected from the coal fired thermal 
plants  under  the  Calcutta  Electricity  Supply  Corporation  (CESC),  West  Bengal  Power 
Development Corporation Limited (WBPDCL) and Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) in the 
Eastern region of India. These coal fired thermal plants are a part of the Eastern Grid.
5 We have 
collected detailed data on inputs and outputs for the years 1990-91 to 1999-2000 for all the 
thermal plants listed above. However, the data for the Mejia TPS and Budge-Budge TPS were 
available for the years 1997-98 to 1999-2000 as these thermal plants were commissioned in the 
year 1997 and had started commercial production only from the year 1997-98. A detailed table 
listing  the  various  thermal  power  stations  along  with  the  year  of  commissioning  of  their 
respective  units  is  presented  in  Table  A1  in  the  appendix.  An  interesting  feature  worth 
mentioning about our sample of thermal plants is that these plants are of different vintages. On 
the one hand we have plants like Bokaro TPS’A’ which was commissioned in the decade of 
fifties,  there  are  newer  plants  like  Mejia  TPS  and  Budge-Budge  TPS  which  are  still  under 
construction  and  only  some  of  their  units  have  started  commercial  operations  on  the  other. 
Moreover, there are also plants that were commissioned in the decades of eighties and nineties. 
So we have a whole spectrum of thermal plants in the analysis representing technologies of 
different vintages. The primary data pertaining to inputs and outputs were collected from the 
WBSEB, DVC and CESC for their respective thermal plants. Only plant level data on inputs, 
outputs and prices of one of the desirable output is needed for our analysis.  
Inputs: The main inputs needed for generation of electricity by the thermal plants are fuel, capital 
and labour. The major fuel input needed by the power plants considered in the present study is 
coal. In addition, the coal fired thermal plants also require fuel oil or light diesel oil (LDO), as a 
secondary fuel to provide the necessary heat input as and when required to start-up the boiler or 
for stabilization of flame at low load. Coal consumption figures are given in metric tonnes while 
the fuel oil (or LDO) consumption is recorded in kilolitres. The data pertaining to coal and fuel 
oil consumed by the power plants are converted from their respective units to tonnes of oil 
equivalent  (See  Box  1  for  conversion  factors)  and  are  then  aggregated  to  get  the  total  fuel 
consumption figure for the individual plants.     11 
Box 1: Conversion Factors 
  1 Kilolitre of LDO      =    0.863 metric tonnes of LDO  
  1 Metric tonne of LDO    =    1.035 tonne of oil equivalent 
  1 Metric tonne of Coal    =    0.67 tonnes of oil equivalent 
Source: India, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (MPNG), (various years), Indian Petroleum and 
Natural Gas Statistics, (New Delhi: MPNG, various years). 
 
  The other important inputs in the generation of electricity are capital and labour. In the 
present  study  we  have  used  the  plant  capacity  in  megawatt  (MW)  as  the  capital  variable 
following Kwon and Yun (1999). The data on labour input cover both production and non-
production (white-collar) workers employed in the plant.  
Outputs: The output variable consists of both desirable and undesirable outputs. While electricity 
generated by the thermal plant is the desirable output and is measured in Megawatt hours (Mwh), 
CO2 emission is the bad output. We have used for the desirable output the plant-wise electricity 
generation data which was made available by the WBSEB, DVC and CESC for their respective 
thermal plants for the period 1990-91 to 1999-2000. 
  Coal is burnt to generate electricity in the thermal plants. Since in coal carbon is bundled 
with ash, carbon, sulfur etc., its burning results in the emission of carbon dioxide, particulate 
matters,  NOx,  etc.,  in  the  atmosphere  as  pollutants.  The  emission  of  these  pollutants  in  the 
atmosphere can be regarded as the byproduct of electricity generation, and thus is considered as 
the  undesirable  output.  The  present  study  considers  carbon  dioxide  as  the  only  undesirable 
output. The data relating to the emission of CO2 are not readily available, as most of the thermal 
plants in India still do not measure the emissions of CO2. As a result we have used the data on 
fuel consumption for generating the data on CO2 emissions. Having obtained the plant wise data 
on the consumption of coal and fuel oil or LDO, the emission factors of various fuels given by 
IPCC (1995) was used to derive plant wise total CO2 emissions. We also collected data on the 
calorific value of coal consumed by the thermal plants in the sample and found that the coal 
supplied to these thermal plants is of a higher grade and has a higher calorific value vis-à-vis 
those used in most thermal plants in India. In the present study while calculating plant-wise CO2 
emissions from burning of coal the calorific values of different grades of coal consumed by the 
                                                                                                                                                             
5  The  thermal  plants  included  in  the  empirical  model  are  Kolaghat  Thermal  Power  Station  (KTPS)  under  the 
WBPDCL, Bokaro TPS ‘A’, Bokaro TPS ‘B’, Chandrapura TPS, Durgapur TPS, Mejia TPS under the DVC and   12 
power plants were incorporated and the CO2 emission factors for coal provided by the IPCC 
were adjusted accordingly.
6  
   The descriptive data on the inputs and outputs are given in Table 2 below. The standard 
deviations for all the variables are less than their mean values, indicating that the plants are a 
relatively homogeneous group (Hetemäki, 1996). 
 
   Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables  Unit  Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max 
Electricity (Y)  Mwh  1874281 1541744 141000 6686101 
Capital (K)  MW  469.64 341.52 67.50 1260
Labour (L)  number  1308 792.48 104 2946 
Fuel  (F)  toe  887848.20 735710.10 68720.71 3197387
CO2 (P)  tCO2  2413491 2182987 139013.60 9169197
    Note: Sample size is 76;  toe  = tonnes of oil equivalent;  t CO2 = tonnes of carbon dioxide;   
    Mwh = Megawatt hour;  MW = Megawatt;  Fuel comprises both coal and oil consumption. 
Electricity Prices: In order to derive the shadow prices of the outputs, market price of at least 
one of the output is necessary. As there exists no market for the undesirable outputs we do not 
get the prices for these. Therefore, in order to derive the shadow prices of the undesirable outputs 
we need to know the price of the desirable output, which in the present case is electricity. The 
data on electricity tariffs i.e., the sale price of electricity is taken as the price of electricity and is 
obtained from CESC, DVC and WBPDCL for their respective plants for the different years.  
  It should be noted here that as the data on CO2 emission used in the present exercise is 
generated  from  the  consumption  of  fossil  fuels  by  the  thermal  plants  it  cannot  be  used  for 
econometrically  estimating  the  output  distance  function.  Hence  the  present  study  uses  the 
deterministic linear programming technique to derive the shadow prices of undesirable output.  
  As mentioned the sample consists of plants of different vintages, some are new and use 
relatively better and efficient technologies and thus emit less CO2 than the plants which are very 
old and pollute more per unit of output. In order to differentiate plants that are old and have not 
                                                                                                                                                             
Titagarh TPS, Southern TPS and Budge-Budge TPS under the CESC. 
6 In India most of the coal that is consumed in the thermal plants is of a lower grade and has low calorific value in 
comparison the coal consumed by the plants under consideration. In order to capture the grade differential while   13 
installed any equipment to control their emissions i.e., the dirty plants, from the plants that use 
new technology which is less polluting and plants which have old technology but have installed 
equipment or have taken additional measure to restrict emissions and hence pollute less i.e., the 
cleaner plants, a dummy variable
7 is introduced in the model. The output distance function is 
initially estimated without making any distinction between the dirty and cleaner plants. This is 
our  Model-1.  The  estimation  of  the  output  distance  function  is  again  carried  out,  now  by 
incorporating the dummy variable to distinguish the dirty plants from the cleaner ones. This is 
called Model-2.
8 The estimated parameters of both the models are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Estimated Parameters  
Value    Value 
Parameter 
Model-1  Model-2   
Parameter 
Model-1  Model-2 
o α   5.713907  8.265383    YY α   -0.073590  -0.069163 
L β   -0.756283  -0.168085    YP α   0.073590  0.069163 
K β   0.526069  0.947600    PP α   -0.073590  -0.069163 
F β   -1.875104  -2.727518    LY γ   -0.253212  -0.306170 
Y α   -0.892840  -0.409482    LP γ   0.253212  0.306170 
P α   1.892840  1.409482    KY γ   -0.103620  -0.017939 
LL β   -0.005172  -0.100494    KP γ   0.103620  0.017939 
LK β   0.148123  0.205437    FY γ   0.261308  0.220088 
LF β   -0.013652  -0.036834    FP γ   -0.261308  -0.220088 
KK β   0.126568  0.060381    t γ   -0.010469  -0.007900 
KF β   -0.181760  -0.210416    tt γ   0.002092  0.001522 
FF β   0.163526  0.250791    Dummy  -  0.051274 
Note: In Model 2 we have used Dummy D = 1 for plants which are dirty and used dated technology and 
D = 0 for plants which are clean. 
                                                                                                                                                             
estimating CO2 emissions from the burning of coal the emission factors provided in the IPCC reference manual are 
adjusted accordingly.  
7 A Dummy Variable assuming values D = 1 for dirty plants and D = 0 for plants which are cleaner is incorporated 
in Model-2 
8 In Model-2, as per our formulation, Titagarh TPS, Bokaro TPS ‘A’, Durgapur TPS, and Chandrapura TPS fall 
under the category of dirty plants while the remaining thermal plants are considered as cleaner plants.   14 
 
5. Results 
  Having estimated the parameters of the distance function we now substitute their values 
in equation  (vii) to  get  the estimated value of the output distance  function. Substituting the 
estimated output distance function in equation (vi) and simplifying we get the marginal cost of 
abating CO2 expressed in terms of the value of electricity foregone.  
  Out of a total 76 observations in Model-1, 15 observations are located on the frontier of 
the output set as the value of the output distance function for these observations is unity, while 
the remaining 61 observations, for which the value of the output distance function is less than 
one, lie inside it. Similarly, in Model-2, 17 observations lie on the frontier of the output set and 
have value of the distance function as unity and the remaining 59 observations lie inside the 
frontier. On an average the mean value of the output distance function for the sample of thermal 
plants in Model-1 is estimated to be 0.9669 with standard deviation 0.0356. This means that the 
electricity generation can be increased by 3.31 percent (with CO2 emissions increasing in the 
same proportion) on an average by the thermal plants if they produce efficiently i.e. if they 
operate on the frontier of the output set. On the other hand, for Model-2, the mean value of the 
distance function is estimated to be 0.9722 with a standard deviation of 0.0275 implying that the 
electricity generation can be increased by 2.78 percent if the plants operate efficiently. But such 
increase  in  output  will  be  accompanied  by  a  proportionate  increase  in  the  emission  of  the 
pollutants. The mean value of the shadow price or the marginal cost of abatement of CO2 for the 
power plants in the study is estimated to be Rs. 3380.59 per tonne in case of Model-1 and Rs. 
2401.99 per tonne in case of Model-2. These shadow prices reflect the trade-off between the 
desirable and undesirable outputs at the actual mix of outputs. This means that if the plants were 
to reduce their CO2 emission by one tonne, they will have to forego electricity output worth Rs. 
3380.59 in Model-1 and Rs. 2401.99 in Model-2. It should be noted here that these shadow 
prices or the marginal abatement costs of CO2 are at constant 1990-91 prices. There is a wide 
variation in the mean values of the output distance function and the marginal abatement cost 
across plants as is shown in Table A2 in the appendix. The mean value of the distance function 
varies, in case of Model-1, between 0.896814 (for Titagarh TPS) and 0.998510 (for Mejia TPS) 
and between 0.937319 (for Bokaro ‘B’ TPS) and 0.997814 (for Mejia TPS) in case of Model-2. 
Thus there is a considerable scope of increasing the electricity output if these plants were to   15 
operate efficiently. Similarly, there is a wide variation in the mean value of the output distance 
function and the mean value of the marginal abatement costs of CO2 across years as is seen in 
Table A3 in the appendix.  
  In both the models there is wide variation in the marginal abatement cost across plants. 
Even for a particular plant there are variations in the shadow prices across different years (Refer 
to Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix). The wide variation in the marginal abatement costs or the 
shadow  prices  of  CO2  can  be  explained  by  the  variation  in  the  ratio  of  CO2  emissions  to 
electricity generation, the different vintages of capital used by the different plants for generation 
of power and the different measures adopted for abating or controlling pollution. The variations 
in the marginal abatement costs by plant have an important implication in evaluating the cost 
effectiveness of the current environmental policies in India. These differences in the marginal 
abatement costs across plants are important because of their policy implications. They suggest, 
per se, the current pollution control regulations in the country cause an inefficient allocation of 
abatement  resources  across  plants  and  a  market  oriented  system  would  potentially  result  in 
transfer of such resources across plants and this would lead to cost effectiveness. 
  It would be meaningful to statistically test whether the equi-marginal principle is satisfied 
for power generation sector in the country. To secure a minimum number of observations for a 
statistical test, we divide the sample into two periods of 1990-91 to 1994-95 and 1995-96 to 
1999-00. The hypothesis to be tested is that the marginal abatement costs for CO2 are same 
within the sub-samples. For this end, after ordering the marginal abatement costs for CO2, we 
separate each sub-sample into two groups of high and low marginal abatement costs. Using a t-
test, we test whether the mean of high-cost group is different from that of low cost group. The 
results of the test are shown in Table 5. From Table 5 it is evident that for both the sub-samples, 
the hypothesis is rejected at 1 per cent level of significance, thereby implying that the equi-
marginal principle does not hold for environmental regulations pertaining to CO2 emission in the 
Indian power generation sector. Thus, the CO2 emission reduction is not being achieved in the 
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Table 5: Test results for cost-effectiveness 
t-value 
Period 
Model-1  Model-2 
1990-91 to 1994-95  4.280  4.017 
1995-96 to 1999-00  6.339  7.030 
 
  We  define  the  ratio  of  total  CO2  emissions  to  electricity  generation  as  our  index  of 
efficiency. As per the definition an efficient plant is associated with a lower value of this ratio 
because it would emit less of CO2 per unit of electricity output generated. In other words the 
higher  the  ratio  the  less  efficient  the  plant  is  and  vice-versa.  On  the  basis  of  the  index  of 
efficiency and the estimated shadow prices, the present study gets the expected result that the 
higher efficiency is associated with a higher value of the shadow price of CO2. This means that 
the marginal cost of abating CO2 emissions is high for a clean and efficient plant while for a dirty 
and inefficient plant it is low. The estimated relation between the estimated shadow prices and 
the efficiency index is given in Table 6.  
 
Table 6: Impact of Efficiency Index on Marginal Abatement Cost 
Variable  Model-1  Model-2 
Dependent Variable:     log(shadow price of CO2)     
Explanatory Variables:     
log(CO2 emission/power generation)  -1.379 (-7.16)  -3.689 (-8.34) 
constant   7.758 (80.78)  5.232 (17.58) 
envt_dummy    3.942 (9.02) 
R
2  0.748  0.668 
Adjusted R
2  0.717  0.629 
N  75  76 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are t-values.  
Plant dummies have been used in estimating both the regressions but are not reported while presenting the 
results. 
 
  From the estimated relationship between the marginal abatement costs and efficiency 
index one can infer that, for the sample of thermal plants, the marginal cost of abatement of CO2 
increases with the increase in the efficiency of the plant. That is, it becomes increasingly difficult   17 
or expensive for a plant, which has invested in pollution abating technology or equipment and is 
emitting less of CO2 per unit of output to reduce an additional unit of the pollutant vis-à-vis 
plants that emit more CO2 per unit of electricity generation. Thus, for a given level of output the 




  There have been a number of studies for India, which have applied the output distance 
function  approach  to  calculate  the  shadow  prices  of  the  undesirable  outputs.  These  studies 
mainly relate to water pollutants like BOD (biological oxygen demand), COD (chemical oxygen 
demand), and SS (suspended solids) (Refer to studies by Murty and S. Kumar 2001, 2002). The 
present study is one of the few to use the output distance function technique for the coal fired 
thermal plants in India and perhaps the only one to calculate the shadow price of CO2 emissions 
for  the  power  sector  India.  The  only  other  study  that  uses  the  output  distance  technique  to 
calculate the shadow prices of the pollutants emitted by the power plants in India, is Kumar 
(1999) which uses both deterministic and stochastic output distance function technique to derive 
the shadow price of (PM10) for the power plants in India. Apart from the studies relating to India, 
numerous other studies have also been carried out worldwide to derive the shadow prices of the 
pollutants using the output distance technique. Appendix Table A6 displays the results of some 
of the studies that use the output distance function technique to derive the shadow price(s) of 
pollutant(s) for the power sector. 
  The present study uses the output distance function approach and its duality with the 
revenue function to calculate the plant specific shadow prices of CO2, for the coal fired thermal 
power plants in India. A distinguishing feature of this framework is that it provides a measure of 
productive efficiency for each producer. The output distance function technique, since it allows 
shadow  prices  to  vary  across  producers,  can  reveal  a  pattern  of  variation  by  production 
techniques, by other plant characteristics like the age of the plant, volume of pollution etc. This 
type of information would be helpful for policy makers in designing or formulating policies to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions. 
  Economic theory suggests that equalization of the marginal cost of abatement across the 
firms would minimise the total cost of abating the pollutants at an aggregate level. The results of   18 
the study reveal that the estimated shadow prices of CO2 vary across plants. The estimated mean 
values of the shadow price or the marginal abatement cost of CO2 for the coal fired thermal 
plants in India for the period 1991-92 to 1999-2000 is Rs. 3380.59 per ton of CO2 as per model-1 
and Rs. 2401.99 per ton of CO2 as per model-2. Considerable differences in the plant specific 
shadow prices point towards inefficient use of abatement technology by the thermal plants in the 
country. One can also infer from the study that the command and control measures are not 
successful in controlling pollution in this sector thereby building a case for consideration of 
various economic instruments like pollution taxes, input taxes or tradable pollution permits to 
control pollution. As the marginal abatement costs vary considerably across plants it implies that 
the  current  environmental  regulations  in  India  do  not  achieve  cost  minimisation  condition. 
Therefore  it  would  be  expected  that  the  introduction  of  environmental/pollution  taxes,  input 
taxes or tradable pollution permits which are highly market oriented and incentive-based would 
achieve reduction in social costs.
9  
  As regards the relationship between efficiency of the power plants defined in terms of 
CO2  emissions  per  unit  of  electricity  output  generated  and  marginal  cost  of  abating  CO2  is 
concerned the results of the study indicate that there exists a direct correlation between the two. 
This implies that a relatively efficient plant is associated with a higher marginal cost of abating 
CO2. In other words, it becomes increasingly difficult for a plant, which emits less CO2 per unit 
of its good output to reduce an additional unit of CO2 vis-à-vis plants that are less efficient and 
hence emit more CO2 per unit of good output. That is, the marginal abatement cost increases 
with the efficiency of the thermal plant.   
                                                 
9 In order to predict the amount of cost savings by these market oriented policies, it would be necessary to analyse 
further the extent to which the costs related to reducing pollution emissions would be decreased compared to the 




Table A1: Details of the Various Thermal Power Stations (TPS) 
Thermal Power 
Stations 
Units  Year of 
Commissioning 
  Thermal Power 
Stations 
Units  Year of 
Commissioning 
             
Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation    Damodar Valley Corporation 
        Bokaro TPS "A"  Unit 1  February 1953 
Titagarh TPS  Unit 1  1983      Unit 2  August 1953 
  Unit 2  1983      Unit 3  October 1953 
  Unit 3  1984      Unit 4  1 April 1960 
  Unit 4  1985         
        Bokaro TPS "B"  Unit 1  12 March 1987 
Southern TPS  Unit 1  1990      Unit 2  15 December 1991 
  Unit 2  1991      Unit 3  1 April 1968 
             
Budge-Budge TPS  Unit 1  1997    Chandrapura TPS  Unit 1  November 1968 
  Unit 2  1999      Unit 2  April 1965 
          Unit 3  1 August 1968 
          Unit 4  31 March 1975 
West Bengal Power Development Corporation Ltd.      Unit 5  1 April 1976 
          Unit 6  1 April 1980 
Kolaghat TPS  Unit 1  9 September 1990         
  Unit 2  9 March 1986    Durgapur TPS  Unit 1  December 1960 
  Unit 3  12 October 1984      Unit 2 *  February 1961 
  Unit 4  1 April 1995      Unit 3 *  1 April 1967 
  Unit 5  14 May 1991      Unit 4  1 December 1982 
  Unit 6  1 January 1994         
        Mejia TPS  Unit 1  1 December 1997 
          Unit 2  15 March 1999 
          Unit 3  28 September 1999 
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  Table A2: Mean Values of Output Distance Function and Shadow Prices Across Plants 
Model-1    Model-2 
Thermal Plants  Distance 
Function 
Shadow Price
(Rs. / tonne)    Distance 
Function 
Shadow Price
(Rs. / tonne) 
Titagarh TPS  0.896814  3086.94    0.966136  2436.48 
Southern TPS  0.964838  3709.37    0.965143  2715.56 
Bokaro TPS 'A'  0.965746  939.31    0.976638  673.47 
Bokaro TPS 'B'  0.977155  3418.66    0.937319  2453.95 
Chandrapura TPS  0.984893  4760.05    0.984939  2679.60 
Durgapur TPS  0.981496  7595.67    0.988897  5726.76 
Kolaghat TPS  0.986287  1312.70    0.982368  909.74 
Mejia TPS  0.998510  2587.78    0.997814  1567.78 
Budge-Budge TPS  0.972593  1716.42    0.960523  630.81 
Overall  0.966916  3380.59    0.972229  2401.99 
Note: The values of the shadow price or marginal abatement costs of CO2 abatement are at 1990-
91 Prices; TPS = Thermal Power Station. 
 
 
    Table A3: Mean Values of Output Distance Function and Shadow Prices Across Years 
Model-1    Model-2 
Year  Distance 
Function 
Shadow Price 
(Rs. / tonne)    Distance 
Function 
Shadow Price 
(Rs. / tonne) 
1990-91  0.961592  4492.213    0.973064  2788.97 
1991-92  0.961590  4768.077    0.972118  2746.79 
1992-93  0.961934  3357.720    0.973692  3679.13 
1993-94  0.967121  2445.274    0.972898  1922.71 
1994-95  0.971794  3091.220    0.976806  2213.27 
1995-96  0.969427  3124.218    0.971137  2327.37 
1996-97  0.959193  3714.176    0.961707  2535.19 
1997-98  0.979707  3074.603    0.981455  2041.24 
1998-99  0.968473  3313.584    0.971292  2187.87 
1999-00  0.964824  2717.520    0.967193  1888.36 
Overall  0.966916  3380.59    0.972229  2401.99 
Note: The values of the shadow price or marginal abatement costs of CO2 abatement are at 1990-
91 prices; The numbers of plants in out study which were seven till 1996-97 increased to nine 
from the year 1997-98 with the commissioning of two new plants.   21 
 
Table A4: Shadow Price Of CO2  (Rs. / tonne)         (Model-1)  
Year  Titagarh  Southern  Bokaro 'A' Bokaro 'B' Chandrapura Durgapur  Kolaghat  Mejia  Budge-Budge 
                   
1990-91  3004.55 9788.45 720.96 2399.59 5329.14 7985.58 2217.22 -  - 
1991-92  3580.52 3069.24 866.61 3594.23 4945.82 15652.64 1667.48 -  - 
1992-93  3470.91 3087.15 675.99 6199.12 4757.24 -  1955.90 -  - 
1993-94  2742.66 2727.92 826.29 3277.56 2740.97 3140.97 1660.54 -  - 
1994-95  2926.60 2990.87 855.24 3565.90 5649.30 4372.71 1277.93 -  - 
1995-96  3535.08 2912.66 872.74 4875.58 3858.90 4926.40 888.17 -  - 
1996-97  2498.35 3316.50 947.68 3897.56 2987.34 11564.53 787.27 -  - 
1997-98  2622.94 2443.97 627.65 2301.21 5400.80 6380.25 962.00 4120.71 2811.91 
1998-99  2869.59 3152.50 1539.58 1995.88 6619.60 9302.76 901.01 2035.36 1405.98 
1999-00  3618.20 3604.45 1460.34 2079.96 5311.41 5035.23 809.47 1607.27 931.36 
Note: The shadow prices or the marginal abatement costs are at 1990-91 prices. 
 
 
Table A5: Shadow Price Of CO2  (Rs. / tonne)         (Model-2) 
Year  Titagarh  Southern  Bokaro 'A' Bokaro 'B' Chandrapura Durgapur  Kolaghat  Mejia  Budge-Budge 
                   
1990-91  2369.08 5415.70 558.19 1979.47 2883.03 4806.78 1510.57 -  - 
1991-92  2733.01 2256.15 656.19 2428.11 2823.26 7148.74 1182.07 -  - 
1992-93  2719.09 2397.26 534.72 4002.66 2741.40 12058.91 1299.88 -  - 
1993-94  2161.01 2208.95 575.29 2961.04 1860.65 2599.88 1092.12 -  - 
1994-95  2306.98 2431.92 615.41 2605.58 2780.10 3877.56 875.37 -  - 
1995-96  2796.70 2414.38 563.99 3535.65 2241.55 4098.96 640.34 -  - 
1996-97  2048.91 2666.44 562.14 2587.65 2047.18 7264.05 569.95 -  - 
1997-98  2115.83 2037.96 440.12 1651.34 2991.31 4965.66 686.01 2413.82 1069.13 
1998-99  2320.92 2516.58 1124.43 1398.27 3478.73 6422.47 653.19 1298.90 477.35 
1999-00  2793.23 2810.25 1104.22 1389.69 2948.78 4024.56 587.94 990.61 345.96 
Note: The shadow prices or the marginal abatement costs are at 1990-91 prices. 
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Table A6: The Marginal Abatement Costs for Air-borne Pollutants from Various Studies 
Study  Period  Sample  CO2  SOX  NOX  TSP 
             
Coggins and 
Swinton(1996) 
1990-92  Coal Burning Utilities 
in Wisconsin 
 
-  $175.7 - $326.7  -  - 
Gollop and 
Roberts (1985) 
1973-79  Fossil fueled electric 
generation in US 
 
-  $141 - $1226  -  - 
Kwon and 
Yun (1999) 
1990-95  Bunker-C and coal 
power plants in Korea 
 
$2.38  $194.1  $91.69  $ 9676.44 
Kumar (1999)  1992-93  Coal burning utilities 
in India 
 
-  -  -  Rs.326.18* 
Our Study  1990-2000  Thermal power plants 




-  -  - 
Note: * this shadow price value is for PM10 and the unit is Rs. per kg. 
          #  This pertains to Model-1 and  @ for Model-2 
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